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THE Interpleader Act of 19361 was drawn with the hope that no fur-
ther revision of federal interpleader legislation would be necessary
for a long time to come. However, the statute does not attempt to
settle all possible questions. In the course of reviewing the various
clauses of the act, in the first instalment of this article, I indicated
several matters that will need judicial interpretation, such as the effect
of partial co-citizenship. It may be interesting to discuss four inter-
pleader problems that have presented considerable difficulty, and see
what bearing, if any, the new statute will have upon their solution.
INSURANCE POLICIES AND OTHLER INSTRUMENTS CREATING A LnMTED
LIABILITY TO JUDGMENT CREDITORS
Legislation frequently requires that one engaging in an enterprise
capable of causing serious injuries or losses to others, especially to
persons of small means, must supplement his own financial responsibility
by furnishing an additional source of reimbursement available to poten-
tial sufferers who reduce their claims to judgment. Thus an automobile
owner may have to file a liability insurance policy in which the company
agrees to satisfy judgments against the insured up to a certain amount.
A broker may need to obtain a surety bond containing a similar obliga-
tion running to the broker's clients, as a safeguard against his financial
collapse. A foreign insurance company seeking to do business in a state
may be compelled to protect its policy holders by furnishing a like
bond issued by another corporation. The liability under all these in-
struments is expressly limited to a stated sum of money. If the appre-
hended disaster occurs, the claims of the victims may amount in the
aggregate to a much larger sum and then a bitter struggle for priority
is likely to take place.
This problem of the distribution of a limited fund is analogous to
I'Profesor of Law, Harvard Law School. The first portion of this article appeared in
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the administration of an estate of an insolvent decedent or a bank-
rupt or a corporation in receivership. However, in such cases the
courts need only follow well settled methods of distribution, which they
have worked out during many years with the help of legislatures. The
property and the creditors are quickly brought into one court with wide
equity powers, and the estate is put into the custody of an officer of
the court-an executor, trustee in bankruptcy or receiver-who is
under a duty to delay distribution until all the claims have been proved.
On the other hand, when judges are confronted with the new types
of limited funds, created by statutes in tesponse to modern business
developments, there is no familiar technique at hand. Assume that
the statute says nothing about pro rata distribution2 or unified adminis-
tration of the fund in a single court, but merely authorizes the claimants
to enforce their rights against the insurance (or surety) company by
separate actions at law and by executions. In so far as the insurance fund
can be said to have a custodian, it is in charge of the insurance (or
surety) company, a private person under no fiduciary responsibility to
the court or anybody else. Consequently, unless judges exert themselves
to devise their own methods for enforcing equal distribution, the com-
pany may pay over the whole fund to whichever judgment creditors it
happens to favor, or the fund may be exhausted by the first creditors
who get judgments.
At least two methods for unified judicial control of the insurance fund
suggest themselves. The first method is analogous to a creditor's bill
filed on behalf of all creditors. For example, the victim of an automobile
accident who has not yet obtained judgment may sue to enjoin the
insurance company from paying the total amount of the insurance to
some judgment claimants, and may also ask for an order that the fund
be equally distributed among all the victims who get judgments before
a fixed date. However, two courts have dismissed such bills on the
ground that before judgment a victim has not acquired any interest
in the fund that will support a suit in equity.3 Although this result is
regrettable, it is in conformity with cases refusing to allow a simple
contract creditor of a corporation to obtain a receivership.
4
2. The New York Vehicle and Traffic Law (1929) § 17 requires the pro rata distribu-
tion of the proceeds of a surety bond filed by a person operating a motor vehicle for hire.
No machinery for enforcing such distribution is set up by the statute. See Blelmeyer v,
Public Service Mutual Casualty Ins. Corp., 250 N. Y. 264, 165 N. E. 286 (1929).
3. Bruyette v. Sandini, 197 N. E. 29 (Mass. 1935), adversely criticized in (1936) 49
HAsv. L. R v. 658; Turk v. Goldberg, 91 N. J. Eq. 283, 109 AtI. 732 (Ch. 1920). See
also Bartlett v. Travelers Insurance Co., 117 Conn. 147, 167 Atl. 180 (1933), noted In
(1933) 28 ILL. L. Rav. 576 and (1933) 43 YAI, L. J. 136. Contra: National Surety Co.
v. Graves, 211 Ala. 533, 101 So. 190 (1924).
4. Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491 (1923); Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S.
36 (1928); Comment (1930) 43 HARv. L. Rav. 1298.
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Secondly, an interpleader suit may be filed by the insurance com-
pany (or surety company) against all the claimants, including those
who have not yet obtained judgment. This method is better sup-
ported by precedents than the first procedure, because interpleader has
been frequently allowed to other kinds of stakeholders who are sub-
jected by statute to a limited liability. In the situation under dis-
cussion, at least two state courts have let the insurance company or
surety company interplead when all the claimants resided within the
state.6
The question now arises whether the United States courts will grant
interpleader when the various claimants reside in two or more states.
Such federal relief was denied in an important case under the 1926
Act, Klaber v. Maryland Casualty Co.7 A casualty company incor-
porated in Maryland had issued a policy of automobile liability insur-
ance to a trucking firm doing business in Kansas with a $5000 limit
of liability for one person killed or injured, and a $10,000 limit for
all persons killed or injured in a single accident. The policy obligated
the company to investigate all claims and defend all suits, paying legal
and court expenses regardless of the limits of liability. By the terms
of the policy, as a Kansas statute required, the company agreed to
pay any judgment recovered against the policy holder for injuries or
death within the policy, and also that the holder of such a judgment
could sue the company directly to compel such payment. A truck
belonging to the assured collided with an interstate bus, killing three
persons and injuring many others. Many claims and suits followed
on the part of citizens of different states, and the total demands for
damages were far in excess of $10,000. After one victim, Klaber, a
resident of Nebraska, had recovered a judgment of $4,000 against the
assured and garnished the casualty company, the company filed a bill
of interpleader under the 1926 Act in the United States District Court
of Nebraska against this judgment creditor, the plaintiffs in the various
suits in which judgment had not yet been obtained, and other persons
5. Supevisors of Saratoga County v. Deyoe, 77 N. Y. 219 (1879); mechanics' lien
cases cited note 10 infra; Chafee, Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties (1932) 45 HAnv. L.
REv. 1297 at 1311.
6. Century Indemnity Co. v. Kofsky, 115 Conn. 193, 161 AtL 101 (1932) (automobile
insurance); New Amsterdam Co. v. Hyde, 148 Ore. 229, 241, 34 P. (2d) 930, 35 P. (2d)
980 (1934) (broker's qualifying bond), citing cases from other states. Cor.Ira: American
Surety Co. v. Brim, 175 La. 959, 144 So. 727 (1927) (bond qualifying foreign workmen's
compensation insurance company); Stusser v. Mutual Union Ins. Co., 127 Wash. 449, 221
Pac. 331 (1923) (bond for public motor vehicle). Interpleader was granted as to the
proceeds of a construction bond in Commonwealth v. City Trust Safe Deposit & Surety
Co., 224 Pa. 223, 73 AtL 425 (1909); see Campbell, The Protection of Laborers anr fa-
terialnen under Construction Bonds (1936) 3 UNi,. Cn. L. REv. 201, 219.
7. 69 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
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who were making or might make claims against the assured because of
the accident. The company paid $10,000 into court and asked that
the defendants be required to interplead with respect to this fund
and be enjoined from prosecuting their actions elsewhere. The District
Court denied motions to dismiss the bill and granted injunctions. The
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decree and remanded the case
with directions to dismiss the bill. The main reason given in the opinion
of Judge Sanborn for denying a strict bill of interpleader was that the
company was strongly interested in the controversy because of its duty
under the policy to defend pending and future suits. This interest
would not cease until the claims of all the defendants had been reduced
to judgment or found baseless.8 Another objection to a strict bill was
that the only actual claimant was the single judgment creditor. Since
the other claimants could not sue the company until they had obtained
judgments against the assured, their claims were considered to be too
remote to be adverse claims within the terms of the 1926 Act at the
time the company filed its bill. "They were not demanding anything
of it (the company) and whether they would ever be in a position to
demand anything of it was purely conjectural." Judge Sanborn recog-
nized that the company's interest would not bar a bill in the nature of a
bill of interpleader, but thought that such a bill would also be premature.
Apparently he considered that a bill in the nature of a bill of inter-
pleader was not authorized by the 1926 Act.
The case does not decide that the company is permanently remediless.
Judge Sanborn intimates that interpleader might have been granted
after several claims had been reduced to judgment, which exceeded in the
aggregate the $10,000 liability. He says that in that event there would
be a real danger to the company whose remedies at law would be as
likely to prove inadequate as those of any insurance stakeholder against
whom claims are made in excess of its liability. Consequently, the
court would probably then have given relief in the nature of interpleader
under general federal equity powers, but not under the 1926 Act.
This decision clearly called for a change of law. The result was
harsh to the casualty company,; which had to deal separately with
every judgment, but the real sufferers were the claimants who had
not yet obtained judgment. Klaber, by fortuitously getting the first
judgment, could collect his claim in full, leaving only $6,000 for the
other victims. Since a second claimant, Erwin, recovered a judgment
for $10,000 soon after the appeal was filed,' Erwin could take this
8. Interpleadeor was denied in a similar state case because of the stakeholder's interest.
Stusser v. Mutual Union Ins. Co., 127 Wash. 449, 221 Pac. 331 (1923), noted in (1924)
.33 YALE L. J. 879.
9. The second judgment was held immaterial, as it came after the appeal was docketed,
Sanborn, J., said (p. 940): "It is obvious that what has transpired sincc the appeal can.
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$6,000, and the rest of the victims were not likely to benefit from
the insurance at all. A court of equity should be able to prevent
this unseemly race for payment by ordering distribution of the insur-
ance fund pro rata among all the claimants who get judgment within a
reasonable time fixed by the court.
What is the effect of the Interpleader Act of 1936 if such a situation
again arises? Assume that more than one judgment has been obtained,
so that the bill cannot be called premature. If these judgments exceed
the limited liability under the policy, the new statute enables a district
court to give complete relief. Even if the casualty company is still
interested because of its duty to fight further claims, such a retention
of interest would not bar a bill in the nature of interpleader, and
these bills are expressly authorized by the Act of 1936. Under the
previous law it was necessary, in Judge Sanborn's opinion, to go out-
side the 1926 statute in order to get a bill in the nature of a bill of
interpleader, and this might have made relief impossible because ser-
vice of process could not be made on claimants residing outside the
district in which the bill was filed. The new statute makes it possible
to have nationwide service for bills in the nature of bills of inter-
pleader. The situation in the Klaber case presents a promising ground
for such a bill, because the great multiplicity of threatened actions at
law by judgment creditors against the company furnishes the elements
of a bill of peace. The independent equitable ground necessary for
bills in the nature of bills of interpleader is thus present. Strong
support for this position is found in the cases granting relief against
numerous suits by holders of mechanics' liens which in the aggregate
exceed the limited liability of the land owner 0 °
Of course, this is not an ordinary interpleader situation. The insur-
ance company cannot pay $10,000 into court and retire from the case.
Besides its duty to pay this money, it has also obligated itself to
defend every claim against the assured growing out of the accident.
Hence it must stay in for the purpose of either defeating the claims or
keeping damages as low as possible. But such a course is entirely
proper in a proceeding in the nature of interpleader. The situation
resembles a receivership, and the court can act much as it would if
the negligent trucking company were insolvent. The assets (insurance
money) are brought into the court, which forces each claimant to prove
not be considered in aid of the bill or the decree. If the facts stated in the bill were tot
sufficient to give the coutt jurisdiction, the appellants were entitled to a diss a h
holding makes the case doubly unfortunate. If the facts at the time of the appdlate de-
cision justified relief, it was a useless waste of everybody's time and money to compel the
stakeholder to go back and start all over again.
10. School District v. Weston, 31 Mlich. 85 (1875); Aleck v. Jackson, 49 N. 1. Eq.
507, 23 At. 760 (Ch. 1902). See cases cited note 5 supra.
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against the fund. The insurance company contests the claims as a
receiver would. Furthermore, although the court of equity has juris-
diction, it can recognize the desirability of jury trials of personal injury
cases by letting each claimant establish his claim (if he can) in an
ordinary tort action. The resulting judgments will be filed in the equity
court until the date set for distribution. If the judgments aggregate
$50,000, each victim will get a 20 per cent. dividend out of the insurance
money, and will have to collect the balance from the assured."1
The new statute says nothing one way or the other about the oilter
point in the Klaber case, that interpleader is premature until more than
one judgment has been obtained. Still, it is respectfully submitted that
Judge Sanborn imposed a needlessly drastic test, and that a bill in the
nature of interpleader should lie even before any judgment. It is
sufficient for the court to assure itself that the danger of multiplicity
of suits is genuinely present. The seriousness of the accident and the
obvious good faith of the victims in seeking damages meet this require-
ment. The victims are "claiming to be entitled to such (insurance)
money" within paragraph (a) (i) of the Act of 1936, at least after
they file suits against the assured. It is true that the victims techni-
cally have no cause of action against the insurance company until
judgment, and only against the assured till then; but substantially they
are all seeking the insurance money from the start. The company's
obligation to defend and its limited duty to pay give it a vital interest
in every tort action. It is no interloper in asking a unification of the
numerous tort actions brought against the assured. Its request benefits
the claimants as well as itself. Instead of a haphazard looting of the
fund by the first comers, a bill in the nature of interpleader filed before
numerous judgments have ripened assures a fair share of the insurance
money to each victim and conforms to the principle, "Equity is equality."
Furthermore, the Klaber case puts the casualty company between
Scylla and Charybdis. If it interpleads before judgment, the Kiaber
case says it is premature. If it waits and interpleads after judgment,
it may find itself barred by laches.'2 It would seem that the sooner
the bill in the nature of interpleader is filed, the better, so long as a
real need for pro rata distribution of a limited fund is made evident.
The occurrence of a disaster giving rise to numerous bona fide claims
that in the aggregate far exceed the limited liability should be a sufficient
showing of multiplicity of suits to support the bill.
11. A pgrocedure like that described above was followed in New Amsterdam Co. v.
Hyde, 148 Ore. 229, 34 P. (2d) 930, 35 P. (2d) 980 (1934).
12. American Surety Co. v. Brim, 175 La. 959, 144 So. 727 (1927); Comment (1934)
47 HAav. L. REV. 1174 at 1179, n. 42. But see New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Hyde,
148 Ore. 229, 34 P. (2d) 930, 35 P. (2d) 980 (1934). As to laches in interpleader, see
,CHAFEE, CASES ON EQUrABLE REmDIES (1936) 105.
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Thus the provision for bills in the nature of interpleader in the Act
of 1936 appears to offer relief to a casualty company after an accident
like that in the Klaber case, or to a surety company giving a qualifying
bond on behalf of a broker who fails with debts to customers much
beyond the amount of the bond.
ALL CLAnfANTS CITIZENS OF THE SAME STATE
When all the claimants are co-citizens, a bill against them cannot
be maintained under the Act of 1936, because paragraph (a) (i) ex-
pressly requires that the interpleaded claimants be "citizens of different
States." However, a federal bill of interpleader may conceivably lie
apart from the interpleader legislation embodied in subsection 26 of
section 24 of the Judicial Code as amended by the Act of 1936. It
may lie under the general equity powers of the district courts under
subsection 1 of the same section of the Judicial Code,"3 if the amount
in controversy be over $3,000. Some cases before 1917 allowed a
stakeholder residing in one state to interplead claimants all residing
in another state, 4 although the authorities were divided. These cases
would be in point if in the situation of the Klaber case all the claimants
lived in one state and the casualty company was incorporated in an-
other state. Federal interpleader might be desired by the company
because of local prejudice or because the state courts imposed strict
requisites upon interpleader, rendering that remedy impossible except
in a United States court.
The question at once arises whether the Act of 1936 is exclusive,
abolishing all possibility of federal interpleader except when the stake-
holder complies with the statutory requisites for relief. Such was not
the intention of the draftsman, and the language of the statute does
not seem to necessitate such a result.
The 1926 Act was not considered by the courts to be exclusive. Thus
an oil company incorporated in Delaware was allowed in 1934 to
interplead several residents of Oklahoma as to the distribution of $5,000,
part of the purchase price of oil and gas property. Kennamer, J., said:"
"Interpleader suits have been maintained in the federal courts of equity
from very early times ...
"Such an action involves two successive litigations; one between the
plaintiff and the defendants as to whether the defendants shall interplead;
the other between the different defendants on the conflicting claims. ...
13. 36 STAT. 1091 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (1) (1926).
14. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat. Bank, 173 Fed. 390 (C. C. S. D.
Ohio 1909); Knickerbocke' Trust Co. v. Kalamazoo, 132 Fed. 865 (C. C. D. Mich. 1910).
Contra: Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 134 Mass. 3S9 (1833). See Chafee, InterpLeader in
the United States Courts (1932) 41 Y.%LE L. J. 1134, at 1142-3.
15. Turman Oil Co. v. Lathrop, 8 F. Supp. 870 at 373 (N. D. 0kla. 1934), noted in
(1935) 48 HAv. L. REv. 854.
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"In the instant case, the amount in controversy is $5,000; the suit
is of a civil nature in equity, and plaintiff is a non-resident of the state
of Oklahoma, and all of the defendants are residents of the state of Okla-
homa, and are amenable to the jurisdiction of this court. No controversy
is presented by one defendant against another defendant; the defendants
and each of them are asserting their claims against the plaintiff; they are
not making a claim that any of the other defendants owe them the com-
mission they claim. Each of the defendants claiming to have acted as
broker in the transaction are asserting a claim against the plaintiff for
the $5,000 brokerage commission .... A controversy exists between plain-
tiff and the various defendants, who are claiming the sum of $5,000 due
from plaintiff. As plaintiff has no claim to the fund, and has not incurred
an independent liability to any of the claimants, but stands in the position
of a disinterested stakeholder, it is entitled to the relief it seeks, and the
determining as to which claimant is entitled to the fund is necessary for
a final disposal of the case. A federal court of equity will complete the
action, between residents of the same state, if jurisdiction has properly
been conferred in the principal action ...
"In the instant case, the interpleader statute [of 1926] is not in-
volved. .. "
This case is perhaps distinguishable on the ground that the 1926 Act
applied only to insurance, casualty, and surety companies, and conse-
quently an oil company, which did not fall within the scope of the inter-
pleader legislation, was not subject to the statutory requisites. It is
certainly arguable that after 1926 an insurance company, casualty com-
pany, or surety company, that wanted to interplead could do so only under
the interpleader statute and could no longer make use for this purpose
of subsection (1) of section 24 of the Judicial Code, conferring general
diversity jurisdiction. This argument would be applicable a fortiori
to the Act of 1936, which allows every kind of person or corporation
to have interpleader under statutory limitations; and it can there-
fore be urged that hereafter all federal interpleader must be brought in
accordance with these limitations. However, there are several cases
opposed to this argument. An Indiana casualty company was granted
non-statutory interpleader in 1930 against two Louisiana claimants,10
who could not have been interpleaded under the 1926 Act. In the
Klaber case,' which also involved a casualty company, Judge Sanborn
considered at length the possibility of granting relief outside the provi-
sions of the 1926 Act, and said:1
7
"The act does not deprive the federal courts of any jurisdiction which
they previously had over bills of interpleader, nor does it change the
equitable principles governing such bills. [Citations.] It merely pro-
vides that in certain cases and for the benefit of a class of disinterested
16. National Sash & Door Co., Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 37 F. (2d) 342
WL. C. A. 5th, 1930).
17. 69 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 8th, "1934) at 939-940.
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stakeholders the courts may exercise powers that could not otherwise be
exercised.
"It does not necessarily follow, however, that because the bill was not
within the statute... , the appellants were entitled to a dismissal of the
suit. The jurisdictional amount is involved and there is diversity of
citizenship. Therefore, if the bill, although not one of statutory inter-
pleader, may be sustained as a bill in the nature of a bill of interpleader,
it should not be dismissed."
It would be unfortunate if the interpleader legislation should be held
to abolish non-statutory federal interpleader. I am not sure whether
an original bill should lie against claimants all residing in the same state,
notwithstanding the reasoning on this point in the Turman Oil case, 0
but ancillary bills have often been granted in such a situation and are
very desirable.' s The new statute was drawn in the belief that the
ancillary jurisdiction would continue to exist. The draftsman pur-
posely refrained from attempting to define this jurisdiction in statutory
terms, because such a definition would be sure to be both complicated
and mistaken. The limits of ancillary interpleader are left to be worked
out by the courts with reference to new situations that may arise.
The Act of 1936, furthermore, expressly recognizes the possibility of
federal interpleader bills that do not conform to the statutory requi-
sites. Paragraph (e) allows a defendant at law to interplead defensively
whenever an original or ancillary bill would lie under either the 1936 Act
"for any other provision of the Judicial Code and the rules of court made
pursuant thereto."' 9 This paragraph clearly contemplates that the new
statute is not exhaustive. Federal bills of interpleader, apart from this
statute, still seem possible under the general diversity jurisdiction when
$3,000 is involved and service can be obtained within the district of
suit. But such non-statutory bills will be needed only in a few cases,
because most interpleader situations will fall within the terms of the
Act of 1936.
INHERITANCE TAXES CLAIMED BY OYFICIALS OF Two STATES20
When a rich man has dwelling places in two states, his legal advisers
ought to take the necessary steps to fix his domicile in one state or the
other beyond the peradventure of a doubt, but such questions are occa-
sionally neglected. On the millionaire's death, officials in each state
seek to collect a large inheritance tax. If the executor could only find
18. See cases cited in Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936 (1936) 45 Yr.u
L. J. 963, 990 n. 86.
19. See Chafee, supra note 18, at 989.
20. See (1935) Report of Committee of National Tax Association on Double Doncile
in Inheritance Taxation, presented at 28th National Tax Conference by Farwell Knapp
of Connecticut, Chairman. This report has a full discussion of the evils of the presEnt
situation and reviews various lemedies other than interpleader.
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it possible to obtain an impartial and speedy decision on the question of
domicile, he would pay the tax to the proper state without any further
contest or delay. But the ordinary procedure by which each state prose-
cutes its claim entirely separate from the claim of the other state sub-
jects the executor to a serious danger of double taxation, and he naturally
feels obliged to fight both taxes by every possible means and in every
possible tribunal. The consequences are bad for all concerned. Two
long litigations are likely to follow, in which the estate and also each
state spends a large amount of money which is naturally wasted if one
state eventually loses its case. Since a decision one way or the other
in the litigation with the state X officials is not res judicata in the litiga-
tion with the officials of state Y, it is conceivable that the courts of each
state might find that the decedent lived in the other state, and he
would thus have the rare privilege of going to an untaxed grave. How-
ever, it is much more probable that the judges of both states will decide
that the decedent was their fellow citizen, and consequently two state
inheritance taxes will be paid for one death. Such seems likely to be
the fate of the fortune amassed out of Campbell's Soups.2"
Clearly, some method should be found by which this single issue can
be settled in one litigation in which the officials of both states are able
to present their respective claims. At least three such methods suggest
themselves.22 The first plan is to settle the controversy between the
two states in the United States Supreme Court. This means that the
executor must fight each state separately in its own courts, and after
losing in the courts of last resort in both states he must obtain two
21. The Pennsylvania courts decided that Mr. Dorrance lived in Pennsylvania and hs
executor paid the inheritance tax in that state. Afterwards the New Jersey courts de-
cided that he lived in New Jersey. This blow was by no means softened by a later
decision refusing to let the executor deduct the Pennsylvania tax payment in computing
the net value of the estate taxable by New Jersey. The New Jersey courts reached the
cruel but consistent conclusion that, since the decedent did not live in Pennsylvania, the
payment of the Pennsylvania tax was an illegal transaction that must be wholly dis-
regarded. Various attempts to obtain federal relief have thus far failed. Dorrance's
Est., 309 Pa. 151, 163 AtI. 303 (1932), cert. denied 287 U. S. 660 (1932); 288 U. S
617 (1933); Dorrance v. Pennsylvania, 53 Sup. Ct. 122 (1932); In re Dorrance's Est.,
172 Atl. 900 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1933); New Jersey v. Pennsylvania, 287 U. S. 580 (1933);
In re Dorrance, 115 N. J. Eq. 268, 170 Atl. 601, 116 N. J. Eq. 204, 172 AtL. 503, (Prerog.
Ct. 1934) [aff'd by memo. 13 N. J. Misc. 168, 176 At. 902 (Sup. Ct. 1935)]; 1-1111 v.
Martin, 296 U. S. 393 (1935), aff'g 12 F. Supp. 746 (D. N. J. 1935). This litigation is
noted in (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 1151, 1374, and in (1934) 57 N. J. L. J. 365, 391, and
discussed by Harper, Find Determination of Domicil in the United States (1934) 19 PNnN.
BAR. QUART. 213 [reprinted in (1934) 9 IND. L. J. 586]. See Campbell's Soups (Nov.
1935) 12 FORTUNE 69, 136.
22. The report cited note 20 supra reviews other possible solutions, such as use of
the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, federal legislation specifically enlarging the juris-
diction of the United States courts to include cases of disputed domicile in tax matters,
reciprocal state statutes, and interstate compacts.
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writs of certiorari from the Supreme Court. Certiorari will perhaps be
granted because a federal question is presented. Under First National
Bank v. Maines and similar cases the Fourteenth Amendment invali-
dates an inheritance tax elsewhere than at the domicile of the decedent.
If the two state suits can be nicely timed so that both of them will
reach the Supreme Court before either case is argued there, they can
perhaps be heard together and decided as a single controversy. This
plan has never been successfully put into operation. -1 It has disadvan-
tages. First, it necessitates the expense and delay of two protracted
state suits and two petitions for certiorari. Second, the testimony may
vary greatly in the two state suits so that they will come to the Supreme
Court on different records and consequently can not be decided as a
single controversy. Third, the great pressure of other business in the
court may cause certiorari to be denied, so that the two separate suits
will never be drawn together in one tribunal.
A second plan was successfully used in an amusing New York case,
Matter of Trowbridge2 5 When Mr. Trowbridge died, inheritance taxes
were claimed by both New York and Connecticut. On the petition
of the executor and with the consent of both states, the Surrogate's
Court in New York allowed the State of Connecticut to intervene in
the inheritance tax proceedings for the purpose of determining the resi-
dence of the decedent. Although the Surrogate's Court found that Mr.
Trowbridge lived in New York, this decision was reversed by the Court
of Appeals. Both states deserve great credit, Connecticut for its willing-
ness to intervene and New York for the impartiality of its judges in
deciding against their own state. But, although it is to be hoped that
this unusual case will furnish an example for future disputes of the same
sort, not every state will be so ready as Connecticut to submit its claim
to a tribunal that may perhaps be unconsciously biased in favor of its
own officials. Moreover, the technique of obtaining a decision from
one state court will become particularly unsatisfactory if the two states
have different laws as to domicile.20
The last method to be discussed, and the most effective, is inter-
pleader. If interpleader is possible, it brings the single issue of domi-
23. 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
24. A review of the Pennsylvania tax on the Dorrance Estate vas 'refused by the
Supreme Court because the federal question was not raised in the state court, note 21
supra. Even if the court ultimately con-ents to review the New Jesey tax, it will not
have the opportunity to consider the interstate controversy as a unit or to hear the
officials of both states. Moreover, New Jersey may succeed in establishing Mr. Dorrance's
domicile therein, so that the Supreme Court will have to uphold the Ngew Jersey tax
without being able at the same time to order the Pennsylvania tax repaid, although in
this event it must have been wrongfully collected.
25. 266 N. Y. 283, 194 N. E. 756 (1935).
26. As to such differences in law, see the report at p. 6-S cited note 20 supra.
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cile into one litigation in the courts of one jurisdiction. Instead of the
executor's being obliged to deny liability for both taxes, as is necessary
when there are two separate state suits, he can safely admit liability
for one of the taxes claimed, deposit the money in court, and leave the
officials of the two states free to litigate their claims expeditiously
against one another. A state court will not usually be the proper place
for such an interpleader proceeding, first, because of unconscious bias
already mentioned, and secondly, because in neither state can a court
serve process on the officials of the other state so as to bring them in.
Only in cases of mutual trust among state officials, such as Matter of
Trowbridge,2 5 will the outside tax officials consent to come in and make.
state interpleader possible. On the other hand, the United States courts
are impartial tribunals much better fitted to adjudicate an interstate con-
troversy," and the difficulty of jurisdiction over the officials is perhaps
not insuperable.
Before 1936, federal interpleader would probably have been impossible
in these inheritance tax disputes between states, because the United
States courts had no personal jurisdiction outside the state in which they
sat and no power to enjoin pending state proceedings. However, the
Interpleader Act of 1936 may enable a United States district court in
either state to grant interpleader against both sets of tax officials. The
previous objections to federal jurisdiction mentioned above have now
been removed. The district court with its nationwide powers of service
of process can compel the tax officials in the other state to come in;
and the statute permits federal injunctions against future or pending
tax suits in the 'state courts of the two states concerned. " But there
are other objections to such a federal interpleader suit that must 'now
be considered.
First, does the absence of complete diversity of citizenship prevent
relief? The fact that the decedent was by hypothesis a citizen of the
same state as one set of tax officials (it is uncertain which set) is not
material, because in federal suits by or against an executor the residence
of the executor is decisive and not that of the decedent?2 But if the
executor is a resident of either state, he is a co-citizen of one set of
tax officials. This fact does not constitute a serious obstacle. Co-
citizenship between the stakeholder and one claimant has been held not
27. If the two states have different laws as to domicile, a United States court may have
to work out a federal doctrine. See notes 26 supra and 51 infra.
28. Section 266 of the judicial Code, 36 Stat. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 380
(1926), requiring a court of three judges to sit upon injunctions against the enforcement
of a state statute or administrative order, does not seem applicable, because the Act of
1936, paragraph (b), gives the district court power to issue an order of injunction against
each claimant "notwithstanding any provision of the judicial Code to the contrary."
29. Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., Inc., 284 U. S. 183 (1931).
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to be a bar under the federal interpleader legislation,: even when the
constitutional jurisdiction of the United States courts must be derived
from their power to decide "Controversies . . .between Citizens of
different States." There is still more reason for disregarding such
partial co-citizenship in inheritance tax disputes, because they fall with-
in another clause of the Constitution, which states: "The judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Consti-
tution."31  The presence of a federal question as to the validity of one
of the taxes under the Fourteenth Amendment is sufficient to permit
interpleader in the United States courts without any diversity of citizen-
ship, whenever personal jurisdiction can be obtained over all the claim-
ants.3 2  For that purpose nationwide service of process is essential,
and hence the executor must bring the case within the terms of the
Act of 1936 by fulfilling the statutory requirement of diversity of
citizenship between the claimants, but the citizenship of the executor
himself has no importance under either the Interpleader Act or the
Constitution. 3
A second objection is created by the Eleventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The tax official of one state (but of which
state is uncertain) is admittedly acting within his constitutional and
statutory powers. It may be argued, consequently, that proceedings
against this official (whichever he is) are really against his state
and thus outside the jurisdiction of a United States court. On the
other hand, the official of one state is proceeding in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and interpleader is the best way to find out
which state official it is. Thus, as to each claim, a genuine constitutional
doubt exists. This seems sufficient to bring the case within the principle
of Ex parte Young.34 After all, the possibility that a defendant official's
30. See Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936 (1936) 45 YA= L. 3. 963, 974,
n. 33.
31. U. S. CoNsT. Art III,§ 2.
32. Several cases of federal bills of interpleader involving a federal question are
collected in Chafee, Interpleader in the United States Courts (1932) 41 Ya L. J. 1134
at 1139-1140.
33. If the co-citizenship of the executor with one claimant is considered to be fatal,
it can easily be avoided through the appointment of an executor who resides in some third
state that is not involved in the controversy. The Supreme Court has said through Air.
Justice Roberts that the motive or purpose actuating a valid appointment of an executor
is immaterial upon the question of identity or diversity of citizenship. Mecom v. Fitz-
simmons Drilling Co., 284 U. S. 183 (1931). The court held that, when the decedent
and the other party to a controversy were residents of different states, a resident of the
opponent's state could be appointed executor so as to defeat federal jurisdiction. It follows
that, if the decedent and an opponent were co-citizens, an executor can be selected from a
different state in order to confer federal jurisdiction.
34. 209 U. S. 123 (1903). The validity of the Tate order, which the state attorney
general was enjoined from enforcing, was eventually sustained in Minnesota Rate Cates,
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action is valid is present in every federal equity suit against an official
of a state or of the United States. The court does not know until the
case is decided whether or not he was acting lawfully. In many cases
jurisdiction was taken to enjoin official action that was ultimately held
constitutional. For instance, in Ex parte Young itself the freight rate
at issue was eventually sustained. Suits in equity against state and
federal officials have become the customary process for settling grave
constitutional questions created by administrative orders, and in recent
years the Supreme Court has rarely let the supposed principle of sov-
ereign immunity interfere with the smooth operation of this process.80
Therefore, it is to be hoped that the Eleventh Amendment will not pre-
vent federal interpleader to determine which of two state inheritance
taxes is lawful. The need to decide the constitutional question in equity
is much greater here than in the usual injunction suit against state
officials, because federal interpleader is virtually the only practicable
remedy. Neither state nor federal courts can offer any satisfactory
alternative.
A United States court should not be deterred from taking jurisdiction
of such an interpleader bill, merely because of reluctance to enjoin the
state tax officials. Injunctions are not essential to the success of the
interpleader. If the court is willing to compel the state officials to
come in and litigate their claims inter se, it may not be necessary to
enjoin the state tax proceedings. The officials will probably see the
fairness of staying these proceedings voluntarily until the United States
court has given a decision on the merits. Hence, interpleader without
injunctions may often be sufficient.
If it should be decided that the Eleventh Amendment applies to such
interpleader suits, a practical way out of the difficulty still remains.
A state may consent to be sued in a United States court by a citizen of
another state. The tax officials of both states can perhaps be induced
by persuasive arguments to give their consent, in order to save their
respective governments the heavy expense of protracted litigations in
state courts. They may be glad to submit the question of domicile to
a single impartial tribunal for the rapid determination that interpleader
makes possible.
Third, even if federal jurisdiction can be obtained, some of the equit-
able principles governing interpleader suits may cause trouble, The
231 U. S. 352, 440-46 (1913). As to the effect of Ex parte Young to deprive the Eleventh
Amendment of much effect in constitutional equity suits against officials, see Conwiu,
TWMIGHT OP THE SUPREME COURT (1934) 80-84; and references cited in Cmu, CAsEs
ON EQUITABLE REmIEs (1936) 264, n. 5.
35. This is illustrated by two recent suits to enjoin federal officials, where the immunity
of the United States from suit was not even discussed in the Supreme Court. Arizona v,
California, 292 U. S. 341 (1934); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360 (1934).
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case resembles an interpleader suit against the tax collectors of two
towns in the same state, each of which claims to be the residence of
a taxpayer. The authorities are divided as to the possibility of inter-
pleader in this intrastate situation,30 and there may be a similar judicial
hesitation about interstate tax complications. One difficulty is that the
amounts claimed for the two inheritance taxes will be different, but it
should be sufficient for the executor to deposit the larger amount in
court s7 or give a bond for that amount under paragraph (a) (ii) of
the Act of 1936. Such a deposit of the larger tax was held satisfactory
in an interpleader suit against two town collectors.38 Then it may be
contended that the two states do not claim the same debt, duty or thing,
since each state acts independently of the other in levying its inheritance
tax. This artificial identity test has been abolished by the last clause
of paragraph (a) of the Act of 1936, providing that interpleader will
lie "although the titles or claims of the conflicting claimants do not have
a common origin, or are not identical, but are adverse to and indepen-
dent of one another."39  It should be enough that the two inheritance
tax claims are mutually exclusive. If one is right, the other must be
wrong. The decedent cannot have been domiciled in both states, and
justice requires that he should pay only one tax. To obtain such justice
is the basic purpose of interpleader. Finally, the federal courts should
not follow the reasoning of some state courts, which refuse to interplead
tax officials on the ground that this would hinder the prompt collection
of taxes. There is no policy in favor of the prompt collection of an
invalid tax, and many cases in the United States Supreme Court have
sustained injunctions against unconstitutional state taxes when the
remedy at law was inadequate.40 In our case, one of the state inheritance
taxes violates the Fourteenth Amendment. And, whatever the adequacy
of legal remedies for ordinary inheritance tax disputes, there is no
remedy at law in either state to decide the question of domicile satis-
factorily.
In short, none of the equitable objections to interpleader against the
rival tax collectors is sound. Therefore, a United States court should
36. See Chafee, Modernizing Iterp erder (1921) 30 Y,= L. J. 814 at 824-327, also
stating some objections to federal jurisdiction that now seem to me unsound. See alT9
CHAPEE, CASES ON EQurrALE RrzmDxis (1936) 27-30.
37. Chafee, supra note 36 at 824; 4 Polrmnoy, EQu1Tr JumsMnUoMxc. (4th ed. 1919)
§ 1323, n. 1; Heinemann v. Hyman, 50 F. (2d) 696 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931); Haymard v,
McDonald, 192 Fed. 890 (C. C. A. 5th, 1912); School District v. Weston, 31 Aich. 85
(1875); Grant Bituminous Paving Co. v. Stange, 225 Mlo. App. 401, 405, 37 S. W. (2d)
469 (1931).
38. Thompson v. Ebbets, 1 Hopkins Ch. 272 (N. Y. 1824).
39. See Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936 (1936) 45 Y,= L. J. 931.




give relief if the executor satisfies the diversity of citizenship clause and!
the Eleventh Amendment.4
FOREIGN GARNISHMENT
Garnishment is a multiple-party controversy like interpleader, and'
sometimes involves residents of two or more states so that a state court
has difficulty in reaching a satisfactory determination of their rights.
In some situations of this sort, a federal interpleader suit by the gar-
nishee may offer the best way out of the tangle. An important example
of such relief is Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works,42 the first and
thus far the only case in which the United States Supreme Court inter-
preted the federal interpleader legislation. For these reasons and be-
cause it may affect the application of the 1936 Act, the decision requires
consideration.
Sanders, a resident of Texas, had given notes to an Illinois corporation,
which were not paid. Among his available assets were fire insurance
policies issued by two Connecticut companies on his homestead, which
had burned, entitling him to about $7,500 of insurance money. In
1927, the Illinois creditor began garnishment proceedings against the
insurance companies in an Illinois state court, serving Sanders by pub-
lication, and obtained a preliminary judgment against Sanders, who had
not appeared, holding that about $7,500 was due from him to the Illinois
creditor. The answers of the garnishees had admitted liability to
Sanders, but gave notice of his claim that the proceeds of the policies
on a homestead were exempt from garnishment under the law of Texas.
They were not so exempt under the law of Illinois. Before any final
judgment against the garnishees and before a trial under their answers
in the Illinois court, the companies interpleaded the policyholder and
the garnishing creditor in a United States District Court in Texas in
1928, paying the amount due under the policies into court. The creditor
moved to dismiss the bill of interpleader, but this motion was denied in
41. A bill of interpleader has recently been filed against Massachusetts and California
tax officials in the United States District Court in Massachusetts. Worcester County
Trust Co. v. Long et als., Equity No. 4292, filed in March, 1936. The temporary injunction
was issued on April 27 by Brewster, J., after the motion of the California officials t6 dsmtss
the bill for want of jurisdiction and to dissolve restraining orders had been denied.
42. 292 U. S. 190 (1934), aff'g 63 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A. Sth, 1933); 'rehearing denied,
292 U. S. 612 (1934). A motion to dismiss the bill was overruled in National Fire In-
surance Co. v. Sanders, 38 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930), rev'g 33 F. (2d) 157 (E. D.
Tex. 1929), discussed in Chafee, Interpleader in the United States Courts (1932) 41 YAL.L
L. J. 1134 at 1169-71. For other comments on various stages of the case see (1933) 33
COL. L. REV. 1062; Comment (1934) 47 HARv. L. REV. 1180; (1931) 26 ILL. L. REv. 77;
(1934) 28 ILL. L. REV. 821; (1935) 23 ILL. B. J. 165; (1931) 9 TEx. L. RaV. 281. See
also Globe & Rutgers F. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 52 F. (2d) 164 (D. La. 1931), noted in.
(1932) 10 TEx. L. REv. 508.
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1930 by the Circuit Court of Appeals.43 After interpleader had thus
been granted, the case went into the second stage and the controversy
between the two claimants was heard on the merits in the District Court.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the District Court, decided in
favor of the garnishing creditor, and this decision was affirmed by the
Supreme Court, so that after seven years of litigation the insurance
money went to the garnishing creditor. The decision of the majority
was expressed by Mr. Justice McReynolds, who in 1916 had written
the opinion in the Dunlevy case,44 which led to the first interpleader
statute. Mr. Justice Cardozo filed a dissenting opinion, and the Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Stone joined in this
dissent.4
.The main issue, on which the court divided, concerned the question
whether the Illinois garnishment gave the creditor a paramount right,
as against Sanders, to the insurance money in the federal court. The
majority held that the Illinois statutes and decisions made the garnish-
ment a lien on the debt due to Sanders from the insurance companies,
and in effect impounded the fund in Illinois for the benefit of the gar-
nishing creditor. Illinois could thus apply its own view of exemptions.
Although there was no final judgment against the garnishees to bind
them, the preliminary judgment against Sanders bound him and was
entitled to full faith and credit in the second stage of the interpleader.
Therefore, the money paid into the federal court must go according
to this Illinois judgment, and never came under the dominion of the
Texas law--especially of her exemption statutes.
On the other hand, the minority thought that garnishment in Illinois
did not operate as a lien or in rem. It was merely in personam against
the debtor of a debtor, or at most an inchoate incumbrance that disap-
peared when the insurance money was paid into the federal court, so
that the fund then became free and dear. Therefore, the garnishment
could have no extraterritorial validity until it ripened into payment, as
in Harris v. Balk46 and other cases holding that the right of the non-
resident principal debtor against the garnishee is discharged when the
garnishee pays the garnishing creditor.
Obviously, this main issue lies far away from the law of interpleader.
The interpleader problems that arose in the first stage were virtually
settled when the bill was allowed and the stakeholders were discharged.
Even the title of the case was then changed. In its earlier phases the
stakeholders appeared as plaintiffs and both claimants as defendants,
43. National Fire Insurance Co. v. Sanders, 38 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
44. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U. S. 519 (1916).
45. Hutcheson, J, dissented in the Circuit Court of Appeals, 63 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A.
5th, 1933) at 907.
46. 198 U. S. 215 (1905).
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but in the case as it went to the Supreme Court, only the two claimants
are named as parties. Thereafter the controversy involved conflict of
laws and doctrines of garnishment, just as the second stage of a life
insurance company's interpleader suit usually turns on some question of
life insurance law.
Although most of the Sanders case has little relation to the possibility
of interpleader under the Act of 1936, some parts of the opinion of Mr.
justice McReynolds are important in connection with the new statute.
(1) Federal jurisdiction under the interpleader legislation is ex-
pressly upheld, and the statutory provision allowing process to run in
any district is impliedly sustained. The Supreme Court recognizes the.
right of the insurance companies to obtain relief from double vexation
through interpleader, although this is not the usual case of a dispute
involving a beneficiary or an assignee.
(2) The decision shows that interpleader will lie under the Act of
1936 although one claimant is a garnishing creditor. This is very grati-
fying, because the Dunlevy case44 proved the need of interpleader against
a garnishing creditor and the interpleader legislation was originally
designed to negative the effect of that case. Furthermore, it must not
be hastily inferred from the Sanders case that the garnishing creditor
will always win the second stage. The garnishment was held to be a
lien in that case largely because of special features of the Illinois gar-
nishment law which do not exist in some other states.
It is also important to observe that the situation in the Sanders case
was entirely different from that in the Dunlevy case. In the Sanders
case the claimants were the policyholder and his garnishing creditor.
In the Dunlevy case the controversy was between the policyholder and
a garnishing creditor of an assignee. Thus the Dunlevy case turned on
the ownership of the policy at the time of the garnishment, whereas in
the Sanders case the policyholder was indisputably the owner at that
time. A garnishment may have some of the qualities of a proceeding
in rem for the purpose of dealing with a chose in action that is ad-
mittedly owned by the principal debtor, and the result of the garnish-
ment may be res judicata against him, although not personally served.
But when the ownership of the garnished chose in action is claimed
by a non-resident outsider, X, then the court cannot adjudicate the
ownership so as to bind X unless there is personal jurisdiction over
him.47 In the Sanders case there was no claimant in the position of X.48
47. Chafee, Interstate lnterpleader (1924) 33 YAL. L. J. 685, at 709; Ward v. Boyce,
152 N. Y. 191, 46 N. E. 180 (1897). See also Ruff v. Ruff, 85 Pa. 333 (1877); (1925) 23
MicH. L. Rav. 543; (1930) 29 Mica. L. REv. 114; (1925) 9 MINN. L. Rav. 570; (1930)
40 YALE L. J. 139; 2 SHINN, ATTAC3EUNT AND GAsRNSnWMasTr (1900) §§ 725, 727.
48. The wife of Sanders intervened in the District Court and asserted her rights under
the Texas law exempting homesteads. But her claim was presumably identical with that
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Suppose that a situation somewhat resembling the Dunlevy case should
arise under the 1936 Act.. G, a creditor of P, sues in Illinois to garnish
a life insurance company, which has issued a policy to P that is now
matured. The insurance money is claimed by X, a. resident of Texas,
who asserts that he is an assignee of the policy. The Illinois court gives
a preliminary judgment against P like that in the Sanders case. The
insurance company interpleads X and G in a federal court in Texas. In
the second stage X proves a valid assignment to him before the garnish-
ment. X would then prevail, and the Sanders case would have no ap-
plication. The garnishment cannot operate as a lien upon an asset that
does not belong to the principal debtor. In the Sanders case the asset
did belong to the principal debtor, the policyholder, and was transferred
by the Illinois court to his creditor; but in the supposed case the debtor's
ownership was contested by the Texas assignee, and the Illinois court has
no personal jurisdiction over him that can enable that court to adjudi-
cate the validity of the assignment.
(3) The Sanders case shows that the substantive law governing the
second stage of an interpleader suit is not necessarily the law of the state
in which the federal interpleader suit is filed. On this point Mr. Justice
McReynolds quoted the language of Sibley, J., in the Circuit Court of
Appeals:'
"We do not think the filing of the federal interpleader and the payment
thereunder of the money into the District Court in Texas operated to
bring it under the dominion of Texas law. The applicant for inter-
pleader often has a choice of forum, and he cannot at his will subject the
rights of the contesting claimants to one set of laws rather than another.
The purpose of the interpleader statute was to give the stakeholder pro-
tection, but in nowise to change the rights of the claimants by its opera-
tion. The interpleader is a suit in equity, and equitable principles and
procedure are the same throughout the federal jurisdiction. The court
is to weigh the right or title of each claimant under the law of the state
in which it arose, and determine which according to equity is the better.
The decision should be the same whether the interpleader is filed in Illinois
or in Texas. No one's rights are intended to be altered by paying the fund
into the court, which as an impartial neutral is to determine them."
This reasoning ought to apply equally well to the Act of 1936. That
statute allows the stakeholder a considerable choice as to venue. He
can select the district where any claimant resides. This freedom of
choice is given to him merely for the purpose of protecting himself
against double vexation. If, in addition, the stakeholder should be
allowed to choose the substantive law that is to govern the rights of the
claimants inter se, collusion might result. One claimant might say to
of Sanders, and her intervention was dismissed from further consideration as immaterial,
before the interpleader reached the second stage. 38 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930) at 214.
49. 292 U. S. 190 (1934) at 200, quoting 63 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) at 906.
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the stakeholder: "I'll pay you $500 to file your federal interpleader bill
in my district because my state has doctrines favorable to me."
A troublesome question still remains. What substantive law is to
govern? Suppose.that the two claimants reside respectively in state
X and Y, which have different rules of law as to the issue in the second
stage, and that a federal interpleader suit is filed in a district court in
state X. According to the Sanders case, the law of X will not govern.
The law of Y seems equally inapplicable unless there is a garnishment
in Y of the same nature as in the Sanders case. What is the court to
do if there is no garnishment at all, or still worse, if one claimant is
a garnishing creditor in X and the other claimant is a garnishing creditor
in Y?50 In such a case of double garnishment, it will be very difficult
to apply the local law of either state and the federal court will have to
work out its own doctrines for the second stage, independently of the
rules prevalent in the two states. Even in the absence of such a double
garnishment situation, it has been held that a question of general law
arising in the second stage is governed by the pertinent federal rule
and not by the decisions of the courts of either state.5 1 There is thus
some possibility that the extension of federal interpleader will bring
about the creation of new federal judicial doctrines of substantive law."
(4) The Supreme Court in the Sanders case expresses its willingness
to construe federal interpleader legislation liberally, in order to give
relief from conflicting claims on the part of residents in different states.
Mr. Justice McReynolds speaking for the majority-and on this point
the minority of the court doubtless agreed with him-quoted the follow-
ing language of Judge Foster in the Circuit Court of Appeals,5 3 which,
though spoken of the 1926 statute, is equally applicable to the Act of
1936:
"The statute is remedial and to be liberally construed. It is broad
enough to cover any adverse claims against the proceeds of the policies,
no matter on what grounds urged."
50. As to the last possibility see (1935) 23 lIm B. J. 165, 167.
51. Kansas .City Life Ins. Co. v. Adamson, 24 F. (2d) 712 (N. D. Tex. 1928).
52. See note 27 supra as to the possible development of a federal law of domicile
through interpleader of tax officials.
53. 292 U. S. 190 (1934) at 199, quoting from 38 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930)
at 214.
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